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P. KEVIN CASTEL, District Judge:
During the post-game show of the 2010 Super Bowl, defendant Hyundai
Motor America ("Hyundai") debuted a commercial that its counsel describes as "a
humorous, socio-economic commentary on lUxury defined by a premium price tag, rather
than by the value to the consumer." (Def Mem. at 2.) The ad, which would eventually
air five times over the course of a month, included a one-second shot of a basketball
decorated with a distinctive pattern resembling the famous trademarks of plaintiff Louis
Vuitton Malletier, S.A. ("Louis Vuitton").
Louis Vuitton has asserted trademark and unfair competition claims under
New York and federal law, alleging that the commercial diluted and infringed its marks.
Discovery in this case is now closed. Louis Vuitton moves for summary judgment on its
trademark dilution claims as to liability only, and Hyundai has moved for summary
judgment in its favor on all claims.

For the reasons explained, Louis Vuitton's motion is granted and
Hyundai's motion is denied.
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-2BACKGROUND
The following facts are either undisputed or described in the light most
favorable to Hyundai as the non-movant. See, e.g., Costello v. City of Burlington, 632
F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2011). 1
A. Hyundai’s Use of Louis Vuitton Markings in the “Luxury” Ad.
Hyundai’s thirty-second commercial goes by the name “Luxury.” (Def.
Opp. 56.1 ¶ 2; Pl. Opp. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 2.) It consists of brief vignettes that show
“policemen eating caviar in a patrol car; large yachts parked beside modest homes; bluecollar workers eating lobster during their lunch break; a four-second scene of an innercity basketball game played on a lavish marble court with a gold hoop; and a ten-second
scene of the Sonata driving down a street lined with chandeliers and red-carpet
crosswalks.” (Def. Opp. 56.1 ¶ 5; Pl. Opp. 56.1 ¶ 5.)
The commercial’s “scene of an inner-city basketball game” features “a
basketball bearing marks similar, but not identical,” to the Louis Vuitton marks. (Def.
Opp. 56.1 ¶¶ 5, 6.) Louis Vuitton characterizes the vignette as “a street-yard basketball
scene in which it would use a basketball with markings copied from the design and colors
of the [Louis Vuitton] Marks, altering them only slightly.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 12; Def. 56.1
Resp. ¶ 12.)
The Louis Vuitton marks are known as the “toile monogram.” As
described by Hyundai, it “consists of a repeating pattern design of the letters ‘LV’ and
flower-like symbols on a chestnut-brown background.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 7; Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶

1

The background section addresses facts pertaining to Louis Vuitton’s motion for summary judgment, and
therefore describes the facts in the light most favorable to Hyundai as the non-movant. When addressing
Hyundai’s motion for summary judgment, the record is construed in the light most favorable to Louis
Vuitton as the non-movant.
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-37.) In the cease-and-desist letter that it would send to Hyundai after the ad’s initial
broadcast, Louis Vuitton described the marks as having “three distinctive elemental
designs – a pinwheel design, a diamond with an inset pinwheel design, and a circle with
an inset flower design . . . .” (Shapiro Dec. Ex. 22 at 1.) Louis Vuitton first registered
this mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office in 1932, and subsequently
registered the mark’s individual elements. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 8-9; Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 8-9.) The
most prominent alteration in the “Luxury” ad was the substitution of the letters “LZ” for
“LV,” although Hyundai made small modifications to the other elements of the mark,
including slight alterations to their proportions. (See, e.g., Kruse Dec. Ex. I.)
According to Hyundai, the commercial sought to “emphasize” the “style,
quality and amenities” of the 2011 Sonata, “a mid-sized Sedan priced at approximately
$20,000.” (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 1, 2.) As described by Hyundai, the “Luxury” ad
sought to redefine the concept of luxury by communicating
to consumers that Sonata offered “luxury for all.” The
Commercial attempted to accomplish this goal by poking
fun at the silliness of luxury-as-exclusivity by juxtaposing
symbols of luxury with everyday life (for example, large
yachts parked beside modest homes).
(Def. 56.1 ¶ 2.) As further explained by Hyundai, “The symbols of ‘old’ luxury,
including the [Louis Vuitton] Marks, were used as part of the Commercial’s humorous
social commentary on the need to redefine luxury during a recession . . . . The
commercial poked fun at these symbols of ‘old’ luxury to distinguish them from
[Hyundai] in an effort to challenge consumers to rethink what it means for a product to be
luxurious.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 17.) In Hyundai’s view, the ad sought “to distinguish [Louis
Vuitton] from the common-sense Sonata.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 18.)
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-4Hyundai does not dispute that the Louis Vuitton marks “are famous and
distinctive” as “widely recognized luxury marks,” and are “viewed by some as the most
valuable luxury brand in the world.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 32, 38, 62; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 32, 38,
62.) While the parties set forth slight and immaterial differences in their
characterizations of the basketball’s design, they agree that the ball was intended to evoke
“the original Louis Vuitton Toile Monogram . . . .” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 13; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 13;
Kruse Dec. Ex. L at 147-47.) Christopher J. Perry, a former marketing executive at
Hyundai, confirmed in a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition that Hyundai worked to “genericize[ ]
the Louis Vuitton marks” so “that they remained very similar” to the brown-and-gold
marks of Louis Vuitton. (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 13.) Perry said that “the brown and gold of
[Louis Vuitton]” were intended to give the basketball a “more stylized and luxurious look
to it,” and that these colors were “a distinctive special reference” that was “tied to Louis
Vuitton.” (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 13, 16; Kruse Dec. Ex. L at 145, 141.) At deposition,
Perry testified as follows:
Q: [Y]ou wanted to create an association with Louis
Vuitton, isn’t that true?
Mr. Perry: With luxury. Yes.
Q: Right. Because in your view Louis Vuitton is very,
very distinctive and a sign of luxury, correct?
Hyundai counsel: [Objection.]
Mr. Perry: Louis Vuitton, the brown and gold convey
luxury.
(Pl. 56.1 ¶ 46; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 46; Kruse Dec. Ex. L at 144.) Liz Boone, an account
executive at the advertising firm overseeing the “Luxury” ad, confirmed that the design
was intended to evoke “Louis Vuitton in particular.” (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 16; Kruse Dec.
Ex. M at 119.) She testified that the design “came out of somebody’s imagination, so
there was nobody to go seek permission from.” (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 14; Kruse Dec. Ex. M
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-5at 46.) According to Hyundai, its advertising firm designed the basketball pattern in
hopes of “evoking luxury” through the “telltale signs of high-end fashion goods.” (Def.
56.1 ¶ 16.) Joel Ewanick, a former Hyundai marketing executive, testified in deposition
that Hyundai designed “a brown basketball as you’d expect with some gold emblems on
it to represent luxury definitely laddering and borrowing equity from Louis Vuitton. And
I believe we changed as much as we could to make it so it wasn’t a complete logo. But
[we] tried to make it look like that so we would get that quick reference to luxury and
people would get the luxury reference quickly. It was the simplest thing.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 43;
Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 43; Kruse Dec. Ex. B at 61.)
The “Luxury” ad was motivated in part by a desire on the part of Hyundai
to change its brand image among consumers. As described by Hyundai, “among those
who highly considered but did not purchase an earlier model of the Sonata, brand
reputation and resale value were the main reasons for rejection.” (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 64.)
As Ewanick testified:
The Hyundai brand is one with significant deficiencies
when you ask consumers what they think about safety,
what you think about amenities, what you think about
styling, what you think about performance. . . . But I
would say generally speaking the idea was to reframe the
way people looked at Hyundai, the brand, and specifically
through the eyes of the Sonata. . . . As I recall, the one that
you’re referring to with the Louis Vuitton in it had a
reference to luxury and how there’s an immense amount of
amenities that you would get in a Sonata that you would
expect to find in luxury brands.
(Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 2; Kruse Dec. Ex. B at 78-79.) Ewanick, who had been at Hyundai at
the time the ad was developed, testified that it was “[c]orrect” to say that Hyundai “used
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-6the Louis Vuitton[-]like marks in order to raise the image of the Hyundai brand in the
mind of the consumer[.]” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 69; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 69.)
Elsewhere, Hyundai states that it “objects to [Louis Vuitton’s] implication
that the sole and immediate purpose of the campaign was to sell cars. Rather, the
admissible evidence demonstrates [Hyundai’s] goal to build consideration and awareness
and try to change the brand perception long term.” (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 3; quotation marks
and alteration omitted.)
B. Hyundai Previously Sought, But Did Not Receive, Permission to
Display Several Luxury Marks in Its Commercial.
Before going forward with the final version of “Luxury,” Hyundai
requested permission from numerous companies to display their luxury marks in a
commercial. Hyundai’s outside advertising firm contacted thirteen companies to see
whether they would permit Hyundai to use their brands free of charge. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 10,
65; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 10, 65.) In a never-broadcast vignette, Hyundai displayed “a
vending machine that dispensed luxury handbags . . . .” (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 8.) Six
brands (Chanel, Prada, Coach, Yves Saint Laurent, Chloe, Gucci and Ferragamo)
expressly declined consent. (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 10, 66.) Others (Fendi, Chloe, 2 Dolce &
Gabbana, Marc Jacobs, Burberry and Louis Vuitton) never responded to the request. (Pl.
56.1 ¶ 11; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 10, 11, 66.) As described by Hyundai’s counsel, “it does
not appear” that its outside advertising firm “ever spoke with anyone at [Louis Vuitton]
about this Commercial.” (Def. Opp. 56.1 ¶ 22; Pl. Opp. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 22.) An e-mail of
November 19, 2009 sent within Hyundai’s outside advertising firm states that as to
permission from Louis Vuitton: “have not been able to get a return phone call – email has
2

Presumably in error, Hyundai lists Chloe as both expressly declining and never responding to the request.
(Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 10.)
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-7not been sent.” (Shapiro Dec. Ex. 34.) A separate e-mail in the chain states:
“Unfortunately we have not found one who would be open to participating yet.” (Shapiro
Dec. Ex. 34.)
C. Hyundai’s Continued Airing of “Luxury.”
The “Luxury” ad first ran during the Superbowl post-game show of
February 7, 2010, following the New Orleans Saints’ 31-17 victory over the Indianapolis
Colts. (Def. Opp. 56.1 ¶ 35; Pl. Opp. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 35; Kruse Dec. Ex. K.) On February
12, 2010, Louis Vuitton sent Hyundai a cease-and-desist letter objecting to the inclusion
of Louis Vuitton imagery in the “Luxury” ad. (Def. Opp. 56.1 ¶ 26; Pl. Opp. 56.1 Resp.
¶ 26; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 22; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 22.) By then, Hyundai had already arranged for
“Luxury” to air three times during the NBA All-Star Game weekend, over February 1214, 2010. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 25; Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 25.) Hyundai executives decided to wait for
an opinion from legal counsel before taking action on the ad, and went forward with the
plan to run the ad during the NBA programming. (Def. Opp. 56.1 ¶¶ 27-29; Pl. Opp.
56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 27-29; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 23; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 23.)
Louis Vuitton commenced this litigation on March 1, 2010. (Def. Opp.
56.1 ¶ 30; Pl. Opp. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 30; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 26; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 26.) Hyundai
executives “took the complaint under advisement,” and again aired the commercial
during the 9 p.m. hour of the Academy Awards on March 7, 2010. (Def. Opp. 56.1 ¶¶
31-32; Pl. Opp. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 31-32; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 27, 31; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 27, 31.)
D. Procedural History.
Louis Vuitton commenced this action on March 1, 2010. (Docket # 1.)
On April 19, 2010, Louis Vuitton filed an Amended Complaint that asserts five causes of
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-8action. (Docket # 8.) Count I asserts trademark dilution by blurring and/or tarnishment
under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); Count II asserts trademark dilution under
New York General Business Law § 360-l; Counts III and V assert trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) and 1114(1); and Count
IV asserts common-law unfair competition under New York law. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4777.)
Louis Vuitton moves for summary judgment in its favor only as to liability
under Counts I and II, including willfulness for any dilution. Hyundai moves for
summary judgment in its favor on all five counts.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Rule 56(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. It is the initial burden of a movant on a summary
judgment motion to come forward with evidence on each material element of his claim or
defense, sufficient to demonstrate that he or she is entitled to relief as a matter of law.
Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004). In raising
a triable issue of fact, the non-movant carries only “a limited burden of production,” but
nevertheless “must ‘demonstrate more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts,’ and come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.’” Powell v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 364 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting
Aslanidis v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir. 1993)).
A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law,” meaning that “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
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-9verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor, and may grant summary judgment
only when no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party.
Costello, 632 F.3d at 45; accord Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 585-88, (1986). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court may
scrutinize the record, and grant or deny summary judgment as the record warrants. Rule
56(c)(3). In the absence of any disputed material fact, summary judgment is appropriate.
Rule 56(a).
“A party opposing summary judgment does not show the existence of a
genuine issue of fact to be tried merely by making assertions that are conclusory or based
on speculation.” Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290,
310 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50
(summary judgment may be granted if the opposing evidence is “merely colorable” or
“not significantly probative”) (citations omitted). An opposing party’s facts “must be
material and of a substantial nature, not fanciful, frivolous, gauzy, spurious, irrelevant,
gossamer inferences, conjectural, speculative, nor merely suspicions.” Contemporary
Mission, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 648 F.2d 97, 107 n.14 (2d Cir. 1981) (quotation marks
omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED TO LOUIS VUITTON ON ITS
CLAIMS OF DILUTION BY BLURRING.
At 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006
(the “TDRA”) states:
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- 10 Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous
mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired
distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against
another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has
become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in
commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or
dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of
the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of
competition, or of actual economic injury.
Although this provision speaks only of injunctive relief, at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5)(B), the
statute separately provides for money damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), in the event of
a willful violation. See generally Sporty’s Farm LLC v. Sportsman’s Market, Inc., 202
F.3d 489, 500 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing willfulness requirement).
The federal anti-dilution statute “is designed solely for the benefit of
sellers. Its purpose is to protect the owners of famous marks from the kind of dilution
that is permitted by the trademark laws when a junior user uses the same mark in a nonconfusing way in an unrelated area of commerce.” TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar
Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2001). It applies “regardless of the absence of
competition or confusion.” Id. In addition, the 2006 amendments eliminated a
requirement that a plaintiff prove actual dilution: under the TDRA, a plaintiff need
establish only likely dilution. See, e.g., Burberry Ltd. v. Euro Moda, Inc., 2009 WL
1675080, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2009) (comparing TDRA with prior anti-dilution
provisions).
There are two types of dilution: blurring and tarnishment. “[B]lurring is
an ‘association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous
mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.’” Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s
Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §
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- 11 1125(c)(2)(B)); see also Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 111 (2d Cir. 2010)
(blurring is “the whittling away of [the] established trademark’s selling power through its
unauthorized use by others.”) (alteration in original; quotation marks omitted). As noted,
the statute states that blurring may occur regardless of actual or likely confusion,
competition or economic injury. Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 105 (citing 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(1)). “Some classic examples of blurring include ‘hypothetical anomalies as
Dupont shoes, Buick aspirin tablets, Schlitz varnish, Kodak pianos, Bulova gowns, and
so forth.’” Id. (quoting Mead, 875 F.2d at 1031). As discussed below, the TDRA sets
forth six non-exclusive factors that go toward blurring. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
The TDRA also includes a fair use provision:
The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution by
tarnishment under this subsection:
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive
fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous
mark by another person other than as a designation of
source for the person’s own goods or services,
including use in connection with-(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers
to compare goods or services; or
(ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or
commenting upon the famous mark owner or the
goods or services of the famous mark owner.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3). Hyundai argues, among other things, that the “Luxury” ad
qualifies as fair use under section 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii).
To date, the Second Circuit’s most comprehensive discussion of the
TDRA is set forth in Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d at 105-13. In that case, the coffee retailer
Starbucks brought dilution claims against a company that marketed and sold a coffee
branded “Charbucks Blend” and “Mister Charbucks.” Id. at 103. The Charbucks logo
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- 12 did not resemble the Starbucks marks. Id. at 103, 106-07. Following a bench trial in
which the district court concluded that defendants had not diluted the Starbucks marks,
the Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded, noting that the district
court did not consider each of the six TDRA blurring factors, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B),
and instead placed undue weight solely on the marks’ lack of similarity. Id. at 107-09.
A. Louis Vuitton Has Established Blurring Under the TDRA.
The TDRA sets forth six non-exclusive factors that go toward dilution by
blurring. They are: (i) the degree of similarity between defendant’s mark and the famous
mark; (ii) the distinctiveness of the famous mark; (iii) whether the famous mark’s owner
“is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark;” (iv) the degree of recognition of
the famous mark; (v) whether the defendant intended to create an association with the
famous mark; and (vi) actual association between the defendant’s mark and the famous
mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). Starbucks explained that no single factor is outcomedeterminative, and concluded that a district court erred by focusing on the similarity of
marks to the exclusion of other factors. 588 F.3d at 108-09.
1.

The Marks Have a High Degree of Similarity

Under the TDRA, to successfully prove blurring, a plaintiff need not
establish “substantial similarity,” and a court considers the “degree of similarity” as one
of six probative factors. See Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 107-08 (comparing TDRA criteria to
previous dilution standard). “Still, a finding that two marks lack similarity is probative.”
Miss Universe, L.P. v. Villegas, 672 F. Supp. 2d 575, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
The Louis Vuitton marks and the basketball design in “Luxury” are
virtually indistinguishable. They feature highly similar geometric designs stamped in
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- 13 gold, set against a brown background. When closely scrutinized, the design in the
Hyundai commercial includes the stylized initials “LZ,” as opposed to Louis Vuitton’s
“LV.” (Kruse Dec. Ex. K at 5:29.) The “LZ” and the “LV” are portrayed in similar
script and design. (Kruse Dec. Ex. K at 5:29.)
As set forth in Starbucks, the context of the marks’ use is central to a
similarity analysis. 588 F.3d at 106-07. Hyundai argues that, rather than making a sideby-side comparison of the designs, the context of “Luxury” underscores the
dissimilarities between Hyundai and Louis Vuitton. In this case, however, the brief
appearance of the Louis Vuitton-like marks heightens the similarities. Absent
exceedingly close scrutiny, the component elements of the Louis Vuitton Toile
Monogram, and their overall effect, are virtually indistinguishable from Hyundai’s
stylized basketball design. Indeed, the brevity of the basketball’s appearance in the
“Luxury” ad, totaling approximately one second, renders it more difficult to assess the
minor differences between the Louis Vuitton marks and Hyundai’s alterations. This
similarity was intended by Hyundai. As Ewanick testified, the ball’s design was intended
to “register luxury with the snap of the fingers.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 18; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 18.)
Considered in context, the ball’s fleeting appearance in “Luxury” heightens the
similarities between Louis Vuitton’s marks and the Hyundai design.
Hyundai also argues that because Louis Vuitton does not produce sporting
items or automobiles, there is no similarity between the marks. It asserts that “[a]
rational person” viewing the “Luxury” ad would view “the couture basketball” as “utterly
distinct from the ever-practical Sonata.” (Def. Opp. Mem. at 14.) In support of its
motion, Louis Vuitton submits evidence that it has sold limited-edition soccer balls in
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- 14 honor of the 1998 World Cup in France, 3 soccer cleats, a croquet set, “pétanque balls,”
golf bags and tennis bags. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 61 & Kruse Dec. Exs. hh-mm.) Louis Vuitton also
notes that it “has enjoyed a strong association with the automobile industry for nearly one
hundred years,” and has submitted a color photocopy of a book titled “Louis Vuitton: The
Art of the Automobile.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 60 & Kruse Dec. Ex. gg.) The photo-intensive book
asserts claims such as, “[t]he paths of the Louis Vuitton company and the automobile
world have often crossed,” and offers detailed accounts of “the Louis Vuitton Classic,” a
series of annual events that includes awards to rare and vintage automobiles. (Kruse Dec.
Ex. gg at, e.g., LOUV 00506, 00631.) Hyundai does not contend that the book is
inadmissible hearsay, only that its sales volume in the United States is not set forth in the
record. (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 60.) Drawing every favorable inference in favor of Hyundai,
and assuming that the sales volume and public awareness of Louis Vuitton’s sports- and
auto-related products in the United States are limited to a niche market, the record
nevertheless indicates that Louis Vuitton has had an ongoing, if limited, presence in the
sales and marketing of sports- and auto-related goods. In this respect, Hyundai has not
come forward with facts to support its dissimilarity argument.
Louis Vuitton has submitted evidence that the “Luxury” basketball design
is highly similar to its own famous marks, and Hyundai has not come forward with
evidence that would permit a reasonable juror to conclude otherwise.

3

The record includes a photograph from the January 28, 1999 edition of the Los Angeles Times showing
basketball star Shaquille O’Neal wearing a Lakers jersey and posing with five Louis Vuitton soccer balls.
(Kruse Dec. Ex. hh at LOUV 00768.)
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- 15 2. The Louis Vuitton Marks Are Distinct.
The greater a mark’s distinctiveness, the higher its degree of protection
under dilution law. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1999),
abrogated on other grounds, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
Hyundai acknowledges that the Louis Vuitton marks “are famous and
distinctive” as “widely recognized luxury marks,” and are “viewed by some as the most
valuable luxury brand in the world.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 32, 38, 62; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 32, 38,
62.) They are entitled to a high degree of protection. Cf. Louis Vuitton Malletier v.
Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 116 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that a “new
Multicolore” of the Louis Vuitton Toile mark was “inherently distinctive”); Burberry
Ltd., 2009 WL 1675080, at *10-13 (concluding that Burberry’s luxury markings were
distinct).
3. Louis Vuitton Exercises Exclusive Use of the Marks.
Louis Vuitton has set forth evidence that in 2009, it “initiated” 9,489 anticounterfeiting raids and 26,843 anti-counterfeiting procedures. (Solitro Dec. Ex. Q.) In
2010, it sent 499 cease-and-desist letters in response to Customs Seizure Notices, after
sending 217 such letters in 2009. (Solitro Dec. Exs. R & S.) Hyundai does not challenge
this evidence. (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 87.)
Hyundai, however, contends that Louis Vuitton has permitted unlicensed,
third-party uses of its marks. It asserts that the Black Eyed Peas featured Louis Vuitton
marks in the music video for “My Humps,” and that musicians Dwight Yoakam and Jim
Jones have featured the marks in their promotional material. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 72-73.) Louis
Vuitton notes that it sent a cease-and-desist letter in response to the “My Humps” video,

Case 1:10-cv-01611-PKC Document 55

Filed 03/22/12 Page 16 of 53

- 16 and states that it was unaware of the other artists’ uses until they were raised in a
deposition. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 72, 73.) Hyundai also asserts that, under a licensing
agreement, Louis Vuitton permits the jewelry company Tiffany & Co. to manufacture
and sell pendants resembling a Louis Vuitton mark, and that Louis Vuitton provides
celebrities with its products for promotional purposes. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 74-75; Pl. 56.1
Resp. ¶¶ 74-75.)
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Hyundai, the record
indicates that, at most, Louis Vuitton had two minor lapses in enforcement, when it was
unaware that two musicians incorporated the company’s marks in promotional materials.
Louis Vuitton responded to the “My Humps” video with a cease-and-desist letter,
requires royalties for the Tiffany pendant, and consciously elects to provide its products
to celebrities as a marketing strategy. Additionally, Louis Vuitton also has submitted a
record that reflects aggressive anti-counterfeiting measures. Based on the record, Louis
Vuitton has set forth evidence supporting its exclusive use of its marks, and Hyundai has
failed to come forward with evidence that Louis Vuitton does not maintain exclusive use
of its marks.
4. The Louis Vuitton Mark Has a High Degree of Recognition.
Hyundai does not dispute that Louis Vuitton’s marks “are widely
recognized luxury marks.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 38; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 38.)
5. Hyundai Intended to Create an Association with Louis Vuitton.
The intent to associate with a famous mark weighs in favor of dilution.
Starbucks, 58 F.3d at 109. Evidence of an intent to associate with the mark does not
require evidence of bad faith. Id.
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- 17 As conceded by Hyundai’s counsel, “The parties do not dispute that
[Hyundai] intended to create an association with the [Louis Vuitton] Marks and the
luxury they convey.” (Opp. Mem. at 15.) Several deponents who worked on the
“Luxury” ad testified that Hyundai and its outside advertising firms specifically intended
to create an association with Louis Vuitton. In the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition taken of
Hyundai, Perry testified that the brown-and-gold colors were selected because they “are
tied to Louis Vuitton” and that the “genericized” marks “remained very similar to the
original Louis Vuitton marks.” 4 (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 13.) When asked whether he wanted
to create an association with Louis Vuitton, Perry answered, “With luxury. Yes.” (Pl.
56.1 ¶ 46; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 46.) Boone answered in the affirmative when asked whether
the marks were designed to evoke “Louis Vuitton in particular.” (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 16.)
When asked whether Hyundai “used Louis Vuitton[-]like marks in order to raise the
image of the Hyundai brand in the mind of the consumer,” Ewanick answered, “Correct.”
(Pl. 56.1 ¶ 69; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 69.) Ewanick also testified, “I believe it was a brown
basketball as you’d expect with some gold emblems on it to represent luxury definitely
laddering and borrowing equity from Louis Vuitton.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 43; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶
43.)
In opposition to the motion, Hyundai notes that there is no dispute that
Hyundai “intended to create an association with the [Louis Vuitton] Marks and the luxury
they convey.” (Def. Opp. Mem. at 15.) It asserts, however, that any such association
was “expressive” in nature, and that the basketball design imperfectly copied the Louis
4

In trademark law, the word “generic” may be used as a term of art that refers to a mark with a broad
meaning over a range of products, and is therefore ineligible for trademark protection. See, e.g., HarleyDavidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing “hog” as generic term for
motorcycles). When the word “genericize” was used to describe the markings, I do not understand it to
imply an effort to make the Louis Vuitton marks generic in this sense.
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- 18 Vuitton marks, such that the Louis Vuitton marks could not be impaired as a matter of
law. (Def. Opp. Mem. at 15.) As discussed below, the “Luxury” ad is not expressive in
the sense that the word is used in trademark law, and Hyundai’s argument about lack of
impairment to the Louis Vuitton marks is ipse dixit not supported by citation to the
record.
Louis Vuitton has come forward with evidence of an intent to associate by
Hyundai, which Hyundai has admitted, subject to certain unsupported qualifications.
This factor weighs in favor of Louis Vuitton.
6. Louis Vuitton Has Submitted Probative Evidence of Actual
Association Between the Marks.
The TDRA’s sixth blurring factor weighs “[a]ny actual association
between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(vi).
To prove actual association, a plaintiff must establish that defendant’s
mark “conjure[s] an association with the senior [mark],” thereby “lessen[ing] the
distinctiveness of the senior mark.” Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 218. “[T]he absence of actual
or even of a likelihood of confusion does not undermine evidence of trademark dilution.”
Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 109. In Starbucks, the Second Circuit noted that the plaintiff
submitted results of a telephone survey reflecting that 3.1% of respondents viewed
Starbucks as the possible source of a coffee that called itself “Charbucks.” Id. Overall,
30.5% of consumers said that Starbucks was “the first thing that comes to mind” upon
hearing the word “Charbucks.” Id. The Second Circuit concluded that the district court
erred by concluding that no evidence supported a conclusion of “actual association,”
noting that the statute does not equate association with confusion. Id. at 110 (citing
Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 221 (the absence of confusion “has no probative value” in dilution
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- 19 analysis)). On remand, the district court concluded that the survey results “constitute
evidence of actual association,” but that because the survey did not present the marks in
their full contexts and the surveys reflected relatively low levels of confusion, “the actual
association factor weighs no more than minimally in Plaintiff's favor.” Starbucks Corp.
v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 2011 WL 6747431, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2011).
In support of its assertion of actual association, Louis Vuitton cites the
research of Hyundai’s own expert, Dr. Jerry Wind. From January 7 to 19, 2011, Wind
conducted a double-blind survey using a test group that was shown the “Luxury” ad and a
control group that was shown the same ad without the stylized basketball. (Kruse Dec.
Ex. cc at 3, 8.) Participants were asked a series of questions about the ad. (Kruse Dec.
Ex. cc at 3.) The study tested among the general population, and, separately, a subset of
prospective Hyundai Sonata purchasers. (Kruse Dec. Ex. cc at 4.)
When asked to identify the brands shown in “Luxury,” 19% of Wind’s
test-group participants cited Louis Vuitton. (Kruse Dec. Ex. cc at 13-14.) Ninety percent
of test-group petitioners said that they noticed the basketball, and 30% stated that the
basketball reminded them of Louis Vuitton. (Kruse Dec. Ex. cc at 30.) Fifty-eight
percent of the test group noticed “a pattern or design on the basketball.” (Kruse Dec. Ex.
cc at 30.) When asked to list which brand or product was advertised in the commercial,
seventy-nine percent of the test group cited Hyundai first, and five percent mentioned
Louis Vuitton first. 5 (Kruse Dec. Ex. CC at 22, 40.) None of the respondents said that it
made them think less favorably of Louis Vuitton. (Kruse Dec. Ex. cc at 13-14.) Only
two percent of respondents in the test group believed that Hyundai and Louis Vuitton

5

Other participants believed that the commercial advertised non-specified car manufacturers, caviar,
lobsters, basketballs, yachts, Spaulding, the police or chandeliers. (Kruse Dec. Ex. cc at 23-24.)
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- 20 were affiliated. (Kruse Dec. Ex. cc at 18.) Nine percent of the test-group respondents
said that the basketball made them more likely to buy a Hyundai Sonata. (Kruse Dec. Ex.
cc at 35.)
Louis Vuitton’s expert, John R. Hauser, SC.D., conducted a double-blind
internet survey from April 9 to 17, 2011. (Solitro Dec. Ex. C at 3, 5, 13-14.) The survey
used both a control group and a test group, with the control group shown a video that
replaced the stylized “Luxury” basketball with a standard orange basketball. (Solitro
Dec. Ex. C at 9-11, 18-19.) Seventy-two percent of test-group participants noticed the
basketball design (compared to five percent of control-group respondents) and fifteen
percent of the test-group recognized the design as belonging to Louis Vuitton; twentynine percent of all test-group respondents recognized it as some type of luxury mark.
(Solitro Dec. Ex. C at 8, 23-24.) Hauser states that the fifteen-percent recognition is
consistent with the percentage of the buying public that is aware of the Louis Vuitton
mark. (Solitro Dec. Ex. C at 25.) Among those who recognized the design as Louis
Vuitton’s, sixty-two percent believed that Louis Vuitton authorized Hyundai’s use of the
mark. (Solitro Dec. Ex. C at 9.) Large percentages of both the test group and control
group interpreted the ad as promoting Hyundai’s luxury qualities. (Solitro Dec. Ex. C at
22-23.)
Louis Vuitton also cites to messages that appeared on the social
networking site Twitter, which purport to show public responses to Louis Vuitton’s role
in the “Luxury” ad. For example, on February 14, 2010, during the weekend of the NBA
All-Star game, Twitter user kailanhindsman wrote, “I think a Louis vuitton football or
basketball would be gangsta.” (Kruse Dec. Ex. bb, at LOUV03476.) That same day,
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- 21 Dhat_Kid_DiCE wrote on Twitter, “Dyd yall See tht Louis Vuitton Basketball? Lols
iWant 1 ^___^”. (Kruse Dec. Ex. bb, at LOUV03474.) By way of another example,
MrExclusive1990 on Twitter wrote, “were they just playing ball with a LV basketball
lol.” (Kruse Dec. Ex. bb, at LOUV03469.) 6
Hyundai argues that Louis Vuitton has a “‘conspicuous absence’ of survey
evidence,” but plaintiff’s record in support of summary judgment includes both its own
expert’s report, as well as the report of Hyundai’s expert. (Def. Mem. at 16.) Hyundai
also argues that the Wind survey indicates that “only” nineteen percent of unguided testgroup participants recognized Louis Vuitton’s appearance in the “Luxury” ad. (Def.
Mem. at 17.) However, in light of the Starbucks opinions in both the Second Circuit and
this District, the survey results present evidence of association. 588 F.3d at 109. As also
emphasized by Starbucks, Louis Vuitton is not required to prove actual consumer
confusion, as in a trademark-infringement case. 588 F.3d at 109; 2011 WL 6747431, at
*4. The ultimate question in blurring is whether a famous mark’s power has been
whittled away by unauthorized use, or whether an association blurs the famous mark’s
distinctiveness. Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 105; Tiffany (NJ), 600 F.3d at 111. According to
Louis Vuitton’s expert, among those who recognized the Louis Vuitton mark, sixty-two
percent believed the ad was approved by Louis Vuitton. (Solitro Dec. Ex. C at 9.) This
is probative and relevant survey evidence that participants associated Louis Vuitton with
Hyundai. Moreover, the nineteen-percent figure emphasized by Hyundai also is relevant
and probative evidence that participants associated Louis Vuitton with the “Luxury” ad.
6

Louis Vuitton’s memorandum of law and Local Rule 56.1 statement make generalized assertions that, in
certain focus groups, the participants’ oral responses reflect confusion about Louis Vuitton’s role in the ad.
(Pl. Mem. at 12: Pl. 56.1 ¶ 53.) The precise nature of the focus group responses is not explained.
Unhelpfully, Louis Vuitton has submitted hours-long, apparently unedited DVDs of these focus groups,
which do not form a basis for this Court’s decision.
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- 22 Finally, while I afford limited weight to the Twitter postings, they provide some evidence
of actual association. Cf. New York City Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc.,
704 F. Supp. 2d 305, 319, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (e-mail from sophisticated consumer was
probative of actual association).
Hyundai’s evidence in opposition consists of the assertions that the focus
group responses are unreliable. As noted, the Court has not relied on the oral comments
of the focus groups. It also relies on one aspect of the Wind survey, which Hyundai itself
commissioned, in which 19% of respondents cited the presence of Louis Vuitton’s logo
(Kruse Dec. Ex. cc at 13), a figure that Hyundai contends is too low to constitute
evidence of actual association. It is statistically significant that 19% of survey
respondents, without prompting, identified Louis Vuitton as a brand shown in the ad, as
is the 30% of participants who, when asked in Hyundai’s survey to focus their attention
on the basketball, said that it reminded them of Louis Vuitton. (Kruse Dec. Ex. cc at 30.)
Louis Vuitton has come forward with evidence of actual association and
Hyundai, in the face of that evidence, has failed to come forward with evidence that
would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude otherwise.
7. Weighing the Six Statutory Factors, Louis Vuitton Has Set Forth
Evidence in Its Favor on Each and Hyundai Has Not Come Forward
with Relevant Evidence in Its Favor.
The plaintiff has come forward with evidence in support of each statutory
factors at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). The defendant has failed to come forward with
evidence that, if believed, would enable a reasonable jury to find in its favor.
Hyundai has admitted that Louis Vuitton’s marks are both distinct and
well recognized. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(ii) & (iv). As previously noted, the greater a
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- 23 mark’s distinctiveness, the higher the degree of protection afforded under anti-dilution
law. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217.
Louis Vuitton also has set forth considerable evidence, including the
statements of Hyundai’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, that Hyundai intended to create an
association with Louis Vuitton – indeed, that the purpose behind the basketball design
was to invoke just such an association. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(v).
As to Louis Vuitton’s exclusive use of the marks, Hyundai has offered
evidence that two recording artists used Louis Vuitton marks in promotional images;
Louis Vuitton asserted that it was unaware of those uses until they were cited in
deposition. By contrast, Louis Vuitton has set forth a record going toward aggressive
enforcement of counterfeiting, and the other instances cited by Hyundai (the marks’
appearance in the “My Humps” video and Tiffany’s use of a Louis Vuitton mark) led to a
cease-and-desist letter and a royalties agreement. Louis Vuitton has set forth evidence
supporting its exclusive use of its marks, and Hyundai has failed to come forward with
evidence that Louis Vuitton did not maintain exclusive use of its marks. 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(2)(B)(iii).
As to the similarity between Louis Vuitton’s marks and the designs on the
basketball, they are virtually indistinguishable. Viewed in context of the commercial, the
brevity of the basketball’s appearance, if anything, renders it more difficult to distinguish
between the original Louis Vuitton marks and the minor variations made by Hyundai to
“genericize” the marks. Louis Vuitton also has set forth some evidence that it has
maintained a limited, if ongoing, presence in niche sports and automobile products. The
degree of similarity between the marks is high. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i).
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- 24 Lastly, Louis Vuitton has come forward with significant, probative
evidence reflecting actual association between its famous marks and the stylized
basketball in the “Luxury” ad. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(vi). Each party’s expert
conducted surveys as to consumer perceptions of Louis Vuitton’s role in the “Luxury”
advertisement. When asked an open-ended question as to the brands identified in the ad,
Hyundai’s study concluded that 19% of respondents identified Louis Vuitton; Louis
Vuitton’s expert found a rate of 15%. When participants were asked to focus on the
basketball, Hyundai’s expert concluded that 30% of respondents associated the design
with Louis Vuitton. Sixty-two percent of those familiar with the Louis Vuitton marks
believed that Hyundai received permission to use them in the “Luxury” ad. Louis
Vuitton also has submitted some evidence from social networking users that reflect
interest and enthusiasm about a Louis Vuitton basketball. The record as to actual
association with Louis Vuitton is substantial and unrebutted.
Viewed in its entirety, Louis Vuitton has set forth evidence that satisfies
each of the TDRA’s six blurring factors. It also bears emphasizing that these factors go
toward the ultimate question of “whether an association, arising from the similarity of
subject marks, ‘impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.’” Starbucks, 588 F.3d at
109 (emphasis in original; quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)); see also Tiffany (NJ), 600
F.3d at 111 (blurring is “the whittling away” of a famous mark “through its unauthorized
use by others.”). The blurring inquiry does not require two companies to be in direct
competition. TCPIP Holding Co., 244 F.3d at 95. Moreover, the text of the TDRA looks
to whether “use of a mark or trade name in commerce is likely to cause dilution by
blurring . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added); see also V Secret Catalogue,
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- 25 Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2010) (“The phrase ‘likely to cause dilution’
used in the new statute . . . significantly changes the meaning of the law from ‘causes
actual harm’ under the preexisting law.”).
Relying on Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d at 112, Hyundai
argues that it cannot be liable under the TDRA because it did not use the Louis Vuitton
marks to designate its own products – presumably, for instance, a hypothetical product
such as the Louis Vuitton Sonata, or the actual sale of Louis Vuitton-style basketballs.
(Def. Opp. Mem. at 11-12.) Tiffany held that the online auction site eBay could not be
liable for trademark dilution when it displayed the famous Tiffany mark “to advertise and
identify the availability of authentic Tiffany merchandise on the eBay website.” 600 F.3d
at 112. Tiffany also argued that eBay facilitated the sale of counterfeit Tiffany products,
but the Second Circuit noted that eBay did not itself “sell the goods at issue.” Id.
By contrast, in this case, Louis Vuitton has set forth evidence that Hyundai
utilized the Louis Vuitton marks for its own branding goals, and, in the minds of some
consumers, created actual association between Hyundai and Louis Vuitton. It did so
without authorization from Louis Vuitton. Unlike Tiffany, Hyundai, as the ad’s creators
testified, was “definitely laddering and borrowing equity from Louis Vuitton.” (Pl. 56.1
¶ 43; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 43.) Hyundai argues that the dilution claim must fail because
“[t]he pattern was not used to designate [Hyundai’s] own goods, services, or business,”
(Def. Opp. Mem. at 11) but that argument conflates dilution with a false designation of
origins claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Tiffany does not stand for the proposition that a
viable blurring claim arises only when a mark designates an item’s origins.
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- 26 Louis Vuitton has come forward with substantial, probative evidence in its
favor on each of the six factors of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B), and that Hyundai has not
come forward with evidence that would permit a reasonable juror to find in its favor.
Louis Vuitton has established blurring under the TDRA as a matter of law. 7
8. Louis Vuitton Has Established Willfulness.
To be eligible for money damages under the TDRA, a defendant must
have “willfully intended to trade on the recognition of the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(5)(B)(i). A damages award is “subject to the discretion of the court and the
principles of equity.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5).
As discussed, the record is replete with statements that Hyundai
intentionally used the Louis Vuitton marks for purposes of promoting the Sonata. (Def.
56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 13, 16, 43, 46, 69.) Hyundai witnesses confirmed that the marks were
intended to evoke “Louis Vuitton in particular” and that Hyundai used the marks “in
order to raise the image of the Hyundai brand in the mind of the consumer[.]” (Def. 56.1
Resp. ¶¶ 16, 69.) When counsel asked Perry whether he “wanted to create an association
with Louis Vuitton,” Perry answered, “With luxury. Yes.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 46; Def. 56.1
Resp. ¶ 46; emphasis added). The basketball was designed to “represent luxury definitely
laddering and borrowing equity from Louis Vuitton.” (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 43.)
Moreover, the record reflects awareness on the part of Hyundai that it
believed it needed permission to use other companies’ luxury brands as part of the
commercial, through evidence that Hyundai sought permission from numerous
companies to use their marks in its campaign. Hyundai sought out permission from
7

Because I conclude that Louis Vuitton has satisfied its summary judgment burden on blurring, I need not
reach the issue of dilution by tarnishment. The Amended Complaint sets forth both dilution theories in a
single count (see ¶¶ 37-46) and does not assert that separate damages arose based on tarnishment.
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- 27 thirteen companies to use their brands, and six of them expressly declined. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶
10, 65-66; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 10, 65-66.) Others, including Louis Vuitton, never
responded to the request. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 11; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 10, 11, 66.) When no
response came from Louis Vuitton, Hyundai nevertheless proceeded to use the
“genericized” Louis Vuitton mark.
Even with Louis Vuitton’s cease-and-desist letter in hand, Hyundai
proceeded to run the ad through the NBA All-Star Weekend and, following
commencement of this action, the Academy Awards. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 23, 29; Def. 56.1 Resp.
¶¶ 23, 29.) According to Hyundai, its management “took the complaint under
advisement, but ultimately determined there was no reason, legal or otherwise, not to run
the Commercial as planned in the Academy Awards.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 42; Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶
42.) When asked at deposition whether the ad’s quality “was more important a
consideration than anything else you were aware of” in deciding to run it during the
Academy Awards, Perry responded, “Yeah. I mean, there was issues obviously. The
litigation was an issue. It was a good ad.” (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 23.)
The deliberate alteration to the Louis Vuitton marks also demonstrates a
consciousness that Hyundai could not lawfully use the marks. Perry confirmed in the
Rule 30(b)(6) deposition that Louis Vuitton “genericized” the marks but ensured that
“they remained very similar” to the Louis Vuitton design. (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 13.) The
coloring was “a distinctive special reference” to Louis Vuitton. (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 13,
16.) Boone testified that the design was intended to evoke “Louis Vuitton in particular,”
but also that Hyundai’s design “came out of somebody’s imagination, so there was
nobody to go seek permission from.” (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 14, 16.) Such testimony
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- 28 reflects the conscious intent within Hyundai to ladder and borrow from the equity of
Louis Vuitton marks while also circumventing any obligation to seek Louis Vuitton’s
permission
In opposition, Hyundai counters that it acted with an expressive intent, and
that its willfulness should be decided by a jury. (Def. Opp. Mem. at 22-23.) The
expressive intent of the ad is more appropriately directed to its fair use defense. Plaintiff
has come forward with substantial, probative evidence of Hyundai’s willfulness, and
Hyundai has not come forward with evidence that would permit a reasonable juror to find
in its favor on willfulness.
B. Louis Vuitton Has Established Blurring Under New York Law
New York has adopted an anti-dilution law that is similar, but not identical
to, the federal statute. It states:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of
the distinctive quality of a mark or trade name shall be a
ground for injunctive relief in cases of infringement of a
mark registered or not registered or in cases of unfair
competition, notwithstanding the absence of competition
between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the
source of goods or services.
N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 360-l. 8 New York law does not require a mark to be famous, and it
“does not permit a dilution claim unless the marks are ‘substantially’ similar.” Tiffany,
600 F.3d at 111 (comparing New York and federal anti-dilution law); see also BiosafeOne, Inc. v. Hawks, 639 F. Supp. 2d 358, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Chin, J.) (a plaintiff
suing under the New York statute must prove “‘(1) that it possess[es] a strong mark one

8

Section 360-l speaks only of injunctive relief and is silent as to the availability of damages, although the
Second Department has indicated that they may be awarded. See Out of Box Promotions, LLC v.
Koschitzki, 55 A.D.3d 575, 578 (2d Dep’t 2008). Neither party has addressed whether the statute provides
for damages, and I need not resolve the issue at this time.
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- 29 which has a distinctive quality or has acquired a secondary meaning such that the trade
name has become so associated in the public’s mind with the [plaintiff] that it identifies
goods sold by that entity as distinguished from goods sold by others, and (2) a likelihood
of dilution by either blurring or tarnishment.’”) (quoting Matter of Fireman’s Ass’n of
State of N.Y. v. French Am. Sch. of N.Y., 41 A.D.3d 925, 928 (3d Dep’t 2007) (internal
citations and quotations omitted)). To determine dilution by blurring, New York dilution
law looks to “(i) the similarity of the marks; (ii) the similarity of the products covered;
(iii) the sophistication of the consumers; (iv) the existence of predatory intent; (v) the
renown of the senior mark; and (vi) the renown of the junior mark.” New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. v. New York, New York Hotel LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 558 (2d Cir. 2002).
Louis Vuitton argues that it has established points first, fourth and fifth in
support of its motion on the federal claim. As to the similarities between the products
covered, it cites to its sale of sports-related items and its ties to the automobile industry.
(Pl. Mem. at 13-14.) Louis Vuitton also argues that while its consumers are
sophisticated, because the basketball’s markings are nearly identical to the Louis Vuitton
marks, the factor either is neutral or tips in Louis Vuitton’s favor. (Pl. Mem. at 14.)
Lastly, it argues that the renown of the junior mark is irrelevant here, because the
basketball was shown in a commercial and was not a product for sale.
In opposition, Hyundai does not separately address the evidence as it
pertains to New York’s dilution law. It merely argues in a footnote that because Louis
Vuitton is not entitled to summary judgment on its federal dilution claim, it is not entitled
to summary judgment on its state-law claim. (Def. Opp. Mem. at 18 n.22.) It also argues
that there is not substantial similarity between the marks. (Id.) As previously discussed,
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- 30 however, the Louis Vuitton marks are virtually indistinguishable from the design of the
“Luxury” basketball.
With no opposing evidence submitted by Hyundai other than that which it
submitted on the federal blurring claim (as to which summary judgment is granted in
plaintiff’s favor) this Court concludes that factors first, fourth and fifth weigh in Louis
Vuitton’s favor. Given that Louis Vuitton has periodically produced and marketed
sports-related items, this Court concludes that the second factor weighs slightly in Louis
Vuitton’s favor. The third and sixth factors are neutral.
Based on the record, summary judgment is granted to plaintiff on its New
York law claim for dilution by blurring.
C. Hyundai Has Not Come Forward with Evidence That Would Permit a Jury to
Find Fair Use Protection.
1. Overview of the TDRA’s Text.
“Statutory analysis necessarily begins with the plain meaning of a law’s
text and, absent ambiguity, will generally end there.” Walters v. Industrial &
Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 290 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks
omitted). An application of Hyundai’s fair use defense must be grounded in the text of
the TDRA, which states:
(3) Exclusions
The following shall not be actionable as dilution by
blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this
subsection:
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or
descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair use,
of a famous mark by another person other than as
a designation of source for the person’s own
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- 31 goods or services, including use in connection
with-(i) advertising or promotion that permits
consumers to compare goods or services; or
(ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or
commenting upon the famous mark owner or
the goods or services of the famous mark
owner.
(B) All forms of news reporting and news
commentary.
(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3). Hyundai asserts that any use of the Louis Vuitton marks
“include[ed] use in connection with . . . identifying, parodying, criticizing, or
commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods and services of the famous mark
owner.” Id. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii). Because “[a]ny noncommercial use of the mark” “shall
not be actionable,” id. § 1125(c)(3)(C), the text of the statute contemplates that fair use
may apply in a commercial context.
As Hyundai notes, “there is limited case law discussing the fair use
exception of the TDRA.” (Def. Opp. Mem. at 5 n.8.) In Starbucks, the Second Circuit
first concluded that the Charbucks logo did not fall within the TDRA’s fair-use
framework because it designated the origins of goods, see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A), but
then considered whether its parodic qualities lessened the likelihood of blurring. 588
F.3d at 111-13. It concluded that because the Charbucks marks were, “at most, a subtle
satire” of Starbucks, they did not qualify as a parody or “effect an ‘increase [in] public
identification [of the Starbucks Marks with Starbucks].’” Id. at 113 (alterations in
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- 32 original; quoting Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506
(2d Cir. 1996)).
2. The Record Includes Express Evidence that Hyundai Intended No
Parody, Criticism or Comment Upon Louis Vuitton.
Through deposition testimony and in submissions by counsel, Hyundai has
disclaimed any intention to parody, criticize or comment upon Louis Vuitton. Rather, it
contends that the basketball design in the “Luxury” ad reflects a broader social comment,
one that embodies “an effort to challenge consumers to rethink what it means for a
product to be luxurious.” (Def. Supplemental 56.1 ¶ 17.)
The text of the TDRA expressly states that fair use applies if dilution has
arisen due to “use in connection with . . . identifying and parodying, criticizing, or
commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark
owner.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). Because Hyundai has
disclaimed any comment, criticism or parody of Louis Vuitton, the “Luxury” ad does not,
as a matter of law, qualify for fair use under the TDRA.
Louis Vuitton has directed the Court to deposition testimony in which
individuals involved in the ad’s creation state that the ad contains no comment on Louis
Vuitton. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 71-72; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 71-72.) In the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition,
Perry testified as follows:
Q. Okay. Why didn’t you just use the [un-altered] Louis
Vuitton marks?
A. I don’t recall the – Innocean came back to us and
suggested adjustments.
Q. Well, why didn’t you say, gee, to make the association
even stronger, let’s just use the Louis Vuitton marks?
A. The intent of the spot wasn’t to – was to portray these
over-the-top overwhelming luxury ideas.
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- 33 Q. Right. And, in fact, you weren’t commenting in any
way or giving any commentary on Louis Vuitton, were
you?
[Defense counsel]: Objection to the form. You may
answer.
A. No.
Q. And the point here was not to actually make fun of
Louis Vuitton or criticize Louis Vuitton, was it?
[Defense counsel]: Objection to the form.
A. That is correct.
Q. So why not use the Louis Vuitton marks themselves?
[Defense counsel]: Asked and answered. You may answer.
A. I suppose we could have. We opted not to. It wasn’t
the intent to try to – the intent wasn’t specific to – the same
reason why we didn’t use specific brands on any of the
other things we did. It was just to convey luxury. And to
your point that the brown and gold conveyed luxury.
Q. The intent wasn’t to say anything about Louis Vuitton,
was it?
[Defense counsel]: Asked and answered.
A. Correct.
(Kruse Dec. Ex. L at 142-44.) Similarly, Perry testified that any commentary in the
“Luxury” ad was of a broad, societal nature, and not directed to any item or brand. He
stated:
Q. Well, were you trying to provide commentary on the
specific things that are shown in the course of the
commercial?
A. No.
Q. No. You were – you were trying to give a kind of
general social comment, correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And am I correct that the individual scenes that you
used within the course of the commercial, you could use
one, you could use another. It’s just a matter of sort of
decisions of which ones you liked best, right?
[Defense counsel]: Objection to the form of the question.
You may answer.
A. Yes.
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Q. In fact, you could have – had you wanted to, you could
have continued to do the ad and have it make sense without
any additional basketball scene at all; isn’t that true?
A. Yes.
(Kruse Dec. Ex. L at 129-30, 147.)
Boone, an account executive at the advertising firm that oversaw the
“Luxury” ad, also testified that the ad contained no comment directed toward Louis
Vuitton or its marks:
Q. So what other than Louis Vuitton were you attempting
to have consumers take away from the basketball with
these markings on it?
A. That was just one teeny, tiny piece of the commercial
that was meant to signify luxury. . . . It was a 30-second
commercial that in its totality at the end of watching that
commercial they would say, oh, this commercial is about
communicating that Hyundai is a vehicle that provides
luxury to all, that we’re bringing luxury – you don’t have to
spend gazillions of dollars to have luxury, that this car – it
was about the car, about communicating the Hyundai
product. We weren’t trying to at all promote Louis
Vuitton. That was not our objective. We wanted to sell
Hyundais through this over-arching communication about
that you can get luxury at an affordable price, that was what
we were trying to do.
Q. You weren’t commenting on Louis Vuitton in any way,
were you?
[Defense counsel]: Object to the form of the question.
A. Can you be more specific with your question?
Q. I’m just asking you were you attempting through the
commercial to comment on Louis Vuitton?
A. No.
Q. I’m sorry?
A. No.
Q. Were you in some ways trying to criticize Louis
Vuitton?
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- 35 A. No.
Q. Were you in some ways trying to make fun of Louis
Vuitton?
A. No.
Q. Were you in any way trying to compare the Hyundai
with Louis Vuitton?
A. No.
Q. And it’s your position that this wasn’t about Louis
Vuitton at all, this basketball, is that correct?
A. Correct.
(Kruse Dec. Ex. M. at 40-41, 43.)
In opposition to Louis Vuitton’s motion, Hyundai does not direct the
Court to evidence that contradicts this testimony. It does not, for example, cite to
testimony or other evidence in which other persons involved in the process explained an
intention to parody or comment upon Louis Vuitton. Indeed, in its memorandum of law,
Hyundai does not even address this evidence. Its opposition instead turns on discussion
of legal authorities that do not apply the TDRA, with little engagement of the record cited
by Louis Vuitton and minimal discussion of the statutory text.
Moreover, Hyundai’s counsel states that the “Luxury” ad makes no
comment on Louis Vuitton: “The symbols of ‘old’ luxury, including the [Louis Vuitton]
Marks, were used as part of the Commercial’s humorous social commentary on the need
to redefine luxury during a recession, even though the Commercial’s overall intent was
not to comment directly on [Louis Vuitton] or the other luxury symbols.” (Def.
Supplemental 56.1 ¶ 17; emphasis added.) It also states that “[a]lthough the Commercial
was not intended as a direct attack on any of the luxury products shown, [Hyundai] used
these items as part of a humorous social commentary on the current definition of luxury
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- 36 itself, which was a contrast to the ‘luxury for all’ offered by the Sonata.” (Def.
Supplemental 56.1 ¶ 2; emphasis added.)
In its opposition brief, Hyundai’s counsel also states:
Surely the Commercial could have been made by evoking a
different designer’s marks on the basketball (e.g., Gucci,
Fendi, etc.). Yet, some symbol of luxury had to be chosen
to make the basketball an integral part of the basketball
vignette; for commentary purposes, HMA chose LVM, the
number one luxury brand in 2010.
(Def. Opp. Mem. at 7.) Yet Hyundai does not suggest that Louis Vuitton or these other
marks were the object of parody, comment or criticism, but instead that these brands were
proxies for its broader observation about an “old” luxury that stands in contrast with the
Sonata line. They were not comment, criticism or parody “upon the famous mark owner
or the goods or services of the famous mark owner.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii).
Louis Vuitton has come forward with evidence that the “Luxury” ad is not
a comment, criticism or parody of Louis Vuitton. Hyundai has cited no evidence to the
contrary. In addition, even Hyundai’s counsel states that “the Commercial’s overall
intent was not to comment directly on [Louis Vuitton] or the other luxury symbols,” (Def.
Supplemental 56.1 ¶ 17) but rather, to make a generalized statement that contrasts the
Sonata with “old” luxury.
Based on this record, I conclude that no reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that the Louis Vuitton-style marks shown in the “Luxury” ad could constitute
“use in connection with . . . identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon
the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner.” 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(3)(A)(ii).
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- 37 3. The Authorities Cited by the Parties Do Not Support Hyundai’s Fair
Use Argument.
Hyundai’s fair use argument is resolved by the text of the TDRA. Both
parties have, however, extensively briefed authority discussing fair use in other contexts.
Even if the statute’s text did not resolve Hyundai’s argument, the authority cited by
Hyundai would not support its claim to fair use. In discussing this authority, I am
mindful that several of the decisions arose from bench trials or preliminary injunction
motions, and therefore may be distinguishable. Certain other decisions explore fair use
under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107, the text of which varies from the fair-use
provision of the TDRA.
First, as under the TDRA, the Second Circuit previously concluded that to
apply trademark fair use, any comment or parody must be directed to the plaintiff’s mark.
See, e.g., Harley-Davidson, 164 F.3d at 813 (the parody exception does not apply when
the purported parody “makes no comment” on the original mark, and “simply uses it
somewhat humorously to promote [its] own products and services . . . .”). As discussed,
Hyundai has stated that the “Luxury” ad makes no comment upon Louis Vuitton.
Second, and relatedly, courts have rejected fair-use arguments that assert a
use directed toward expansive social criticism, as opposed to a targeted comment or
parody of the original. Applying the Copyright Act, Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310
(2d Cir. 1992), stated that absent a requirement that “the copied work must be, at least in
part, an object of the parody,” “there would be no real limitation on the copier’s use of
another’s copyrighted work to make a statement on some aspect of society at large.”
Third, the TDRA extends protection to “[a]ny noncommercial use of a
mark,” while simultaneously protecting a use “identifying and parodying, criticizing, or
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- 38 commenting upon the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) & 1125(c)(3)(C).
As such, the TDRA contemplates the protection of parody, criticism or comment for
commercial use. In other contexts, however, courts have concluded that the promotional
use of a senior mark weighs against fair use protections. See, e.g., Harley-Davidson, 164
F.3d at 813; Deere & Company v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1994)
(promotional ads are not “worthy purposes of expression,” but done “simply to sell
products,” a “purpose that can easily be achieved in other ways.”). Given that Hyundai
was “definitely laddering and borrowing equity from Louis Vuitton” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 43; Def.
56.1 Resp. ¶ 43) and did so for the purpose of advertising the Sonata, under Second
Circuit authority pre-dating the TDRA, Hyundai’s promotional purpose would weigh
against fair use protection.
Fourth, in opposition to Louis Vuitton’s motion and in support of its own
summary judgment motion, Hyundai heavily relies on authority that concluded, as a
matter of law, that a defendant’s use of a mark constituted parody or comment. 9 Courts
have, however, not applied fair use when the defendant’s mark is instead “a subtle satire”
of the original. Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 113. The instances of parody that Hyundai cites
involve over-the-top, unmistakable parodies of an original. See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v.
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 496-97 (2d Cir. 1989)
(variations in coloring, content and the labeling “a satire” alerted consumer of difference
between parody and original); Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d at 501, 503 (an “an unclean
‘grotesque’ boar” puppet bears no resemblance to luncheon meat, and “consumers are
likely to see the name ‘Spa’am’ as the joke it was intended to be.”); Tommy Hilfiger
9

“Parody or satire, as we understand it, is when one artist, for comic effect or social commentary, closely
imitates the style of another artist and in so doing creates a new art work that makes ridiculous the style and
expression of the original.” Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309-10.
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- 39 Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(Mukasey, J.) (pet perfume called “Timmy Holedigger” was an “obvious parod[y]” of
Tommy Hilfiger brand); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507
F.3d 252, 260-61 (4th Cir. 2007) (reciting “immediate[ ]” differences between dog chew
toy and Louis Vuitton products). Even if Hyundai had not expressly disavowed
comment, criticism or parody directed to Louis Vuitton, the cases identifying such clearcut instances of fair use do not go toward the existence of triable issues of fact in the
“Luxury” ad.
Therefore, even if Hyundai’s fair use argument was not resolved by the
text of the TDRA, the authorities extensively briefed by the parties would not support a
different result.
II. HYUNDAI’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIED.
Hyundai has moved for summary judgment in its favor on all claims
asserted by Louis Vuitton. In addition to its trademark dilution claims, Louis Vuitton
asserts trademark infringement claims under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(a)(1)(A) & 1114(a), and
common-law unfair competition under New York law. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55-77.) The
elements of a federal trademark-infringement claim and a New York unfair competition
claim are “almost indistinguishable,” except that New York requires an additional
element of bad faith. Grout Shield Distribs., LLC v. Elio E. Salvo, Inc., __ F. Supp. 2d
__, 2011 WL 5560296, at *11 n.15 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2011) (citing U.S. Polo Ass’n,
Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
The Lanham Act provides for a trademark-infringement claim if
unapproved use of a mark is likely to cause confusion as to affiliation, sponsorship, or

Case 1:10-cv-01611-PKC Document 55

Filed 03/22/12 Page 40 of 53

- 40 approval. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); see generally Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1979) (reviewing infringement claim
as it relates to affiliation, sponsorship or approval). To a large extent, both parties’
submissions have failed to focus on the key issue plaintiff’s trademark infringement
claims: Whether prospective purchasers of Hyundai Sonatas incorrectly perceived Louis
Vuitton to have sponsored, associated or affiliated with Hyundai based on the “Luxury”
ad. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 204-05. The evidence and
theory of liability in this context is likely to be significantly different than in many
trademark actions, where allegedly confusing marks are employed by head-to-head
competitors, see, e.g., Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 114 & n.6, or even, as in Tommy Hilfiger,
221 F. Supp. 2d at 416-21, where the allegedly infringing mark is displayed on products
available for purchase by the general public. In its motion for summary judgment,
Hyundai often strays from the issue of whether Hyundai Sonata consumers have made
misinformed purchasing decisions based on Louis Vuitton’s role in the “Luxury” ad, and
instead focuses heavily on the ad’s purportedly expressive nature and the protections that
should be afforded to it.
For the reasons explained, I conclude that Hyundai has not met the initial
summary judgment burden of coming forward with facts that, if undisputed, would entitle
it to judgment as a matter of law. See Vt. Teddy Bear, 373 F.3d at 244. In reviewing
Hyundai’s motion for summary judgment, I construe the record in the light most
favorable to Louis Vuitton as the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in its
favor. Costello, 632 F.3d at 45.
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- 41 A. Weighing Consumer Confusion under Polaroid.
In Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961), Judge Friendly, writing for the panel, set forth eight factors to be considered in
determining the likelihood of confusion. They are: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the
similarity of the parties’ marks; (3) the proximity of the parties’ products in the
marketplace; (4) the likelihood that the plaintiff will “bridge the gap” between the
products; (5) evidence of actual consumer confusion; (6) whether the defendant acted
with bad faith in adopting the mark; (7) the defendant's product quality; and (8) consumer
sophistication. A court is not “limited to consideration of only these factors.” Louis
Vuitton Malletier, 454 F.3d at 118. No single Polaroid factor is dispositive. Nabisco,
Inc. v. Warner Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2000).
1. Strength of the Mark.
Hyundai asserts that Louis Vuitton’s “undeniably strong” mark weighs
against consumer confusion. (Def. Mem. at 8.) It relies on Yankee Publishing Inc. v.
News America Publishing Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 271-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), in which, at
the conclusion of a bench trial, Judge Leval observed that a strong mark lessens the
likelihood of confusion when consumers encounter the mark as a clear joke – in that case,
a cover of New York magazine issue that was a “very recognizable takeoff” on the Old
Farmer’s Almanac. As previously discussed, however, the design of the “Luxury”
basketball and the Louis Vuitton marks are not obviously different, and the “jest or
commentary” reflected in the marks’ use is less apparent than what Judge Leval found at
the conclusion of a bench trial. See also Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 116 (a mark’s strength
weighs against confusion only “in the limited circumstance where the defendants’ mark is
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- 42 a clear parody and there is widespread familiarity with the parody.”). Moreover, Hyundai
makes no citations to the record in support of this prong, but asserts, ipse dixit, that there
is no confusion about the source of the Louis Vuitton marks in the “Luxury” ad. (Def.
Mem. at 8.) This is insufficient to establish its entitlement to summary judgment.
See Vt. Teddy Bear, 373 F.3d at 244.
Hyundai has not established that the undisputed strength of Louis
Vuitton’s mark weighs in Hyundai’s favor.
2. Similarity of the Marks.
As previously discussed, the modified marks in the “Luxury” ad closely
resemble the Louis Vuitton marks, a similarity made all the more difficult to distinguish
by the ball’s brief appearance in the commercial. Additionally, as noted, Louis Vuitton
has submitted some evidence that it has produced sports items, include niche, high-end
products. Based on this record, Hyundai has not established that the marks are dissimilar.
This factor does not weigh in Hyundai’s favor.
3. Competitive Proximity.
Based upon the record submitted by the parties, there is virtually no
competitive proximity between Louis Vuitton’s luxury consumer goods and Hyundai’s
automobiles. Even noting Louis Vuitton’s association with high-end vehicles, as
depicted in “Louis Vuitton: The Art of the Automobile,” its role apparently has been
limited to sponsorships of certain shows and awards that honor rare car models.
Similarly, as discussed, Louis Vuitton has set forth evidence that it has sold certain sports
products, but not that it has sold any basketball-related items.
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- 43 Therefore, construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Louis
Vuitton as the non-movant, I conclude that the competitive proximity of Hyundai’s
vehicles and Louis Vuitton’s luxury products is minimal to non-existent, and that this
factor weighs in Hyundai’s favor.
4. “Bridging the Gap.”
“Bridging the gap refers to the senior user’s interest in preserving avenues
of expansion and entering into related fields.” Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d at 504 (quotation
marks omitted). There is no evidence that Louis Vuitton intends to further bridge the gap
between luxury consumer goods and automobiles. As Hyundai notes, Louis Vuitton has
no marks registered for use in automobiles. (Def. Opp. 56.1 ¶¶ 7-10.) Counsel to Louis
Vuitton states that certain other luxury brands, such as Gucci, have co-sponsored
automobiles in recent years (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 90), but Louis Vuitton does not assert that it
intends to do the same. As to bridging the gap to sports-related items, as discussed, Louis
Vuitton has had a limited presence in the production and sale of items such as golf bags
and certain soccer-related products. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 61; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 61.) Louis Vuitton
does not assert that it has an interest in further expanding to this market or entering into
related fields. See generally Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d at 504. Similarly, there is no
evidence that Hyundai intends to expand into products such as handbags.
Because Louis Vuitton has not come forward with evidence that it is likely
to bridge the gap, this factor weighs in Hyundai’s favor.
5. Actual Confusion
“[E]vidence of actual confusion regarding affiliation or sponsorship is
also entirely relevant to the ultimate likelihood-of-confusion inquiry.” Morningside
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- 44 Group Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Group, LLC, 182 F.3d 133, 141 (2d Cir. 1999). “‘The
public’s belief that the mark’s owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the
trademark satisfies the confusion requirement.’” Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 114 (quoting
Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 384 (2d Cir. 2005)).
In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 204, the defendant, which
owned an adult-movie theater, argued that there could be no instance of confusion as to
whether an adult film “originated with” plaintiff Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc.
based on the film’s display of marks highly similar to those used by the well known
cheerleading squad. The Second Circuit stated that confusion was not limited to the
film’s origination, and instead could arise if the public believed that the plaintiff
“sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the trademark” – in that case, a slightly
altered version of a cheerleading uniform. Id. at 205. According to the Second Circuit,
“the uniform depicted in ‘Debbie Does Dallas’ unquestionably brings to mind the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders. Indeed, it is hard to believe that anyone who had seen
defendants’ sexually depraved film could ever thereafter disassociate it from plaintiff’s
cheerleaders.” Id.; 10 see also Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799
F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing confusion as to whether consumers perceived
the plaintiff to have consented to defendant’s use of unique stitching pattern).

10

In affirming the district court’s conclusion of actual confusion, the court in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders
did not rely on survey evidence or a record of consumer misimpressions so much as its own impression
concerning the marks’ similarity and the film’s effect on the consuming public. Id. To some extent, it
appears to have blended an analysis of actual confusion in the trademark infringement context with
tarnishment in the dilution context. Id. (noting harm to reputation caused by likely association with adult
film).
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- 45 Thus, in this case, actual confusion is narrowly focused on the issue of
whether prospective Hyundai Sonata consumers incorrectly perceived Louis Vuitton to
have affiliated with, associated with or sponsored the Hyundai “Luxury” ad.
As discussed in Hyundai’s dilution claim, various postings on Twitter
misapprehended the authenticity of the Louis Vuitton-like basketball. (Kruse Dec. Ex.
bb.) Other posts mentioned Louis Vuitton’s apparent nexus with Hyundai. A poster
named rebelscholar wrote, “Did I just see a Louis Vuitton basketball in a Hyundai
commercial???” (Kruse Dec. Ex. bb at LOU03467.) A post by syntheticgent stated,
“That luxury hyndai sonata commercial is hard body. LV basketball wit marble & gold
backboard was so sick!” (Kruse Dec. Ex. bb at LOU03470.) Finally, superbetch10
stated, “in one of Hyundai’s ad, there is a guy holding a basketball with the LV logo.”
(Kruse Dec. Ex. bb at LOU03478.) Certain other Twitter posts mentioned both brands,
but did so in the context of remarking on this litigation, thereby reflecting an express
awareness that Louis Vuitton had not sponsored or affiliated with the ad. 11 While
anecdotal and limited, the postings to Twitter reflect some actual confusion as to Louis
Vuitton’s role in the Hyundai ad, in the same fashion as letters or phone calls. At the
same time, Louis Vuitton’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness testified that no consumer contacted
Louis Vuitton about the commercial. 12 (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 57-58.)
The parties dispute the relevance and methodologies of one another’s
consumer surveys. “To be probative and meaningful . . . surveys . . . must rely upon
11

For instance, PurseBlog commented, “Anyone else notice the Hyundai commercial that LV is sueing
them over is still airing? The basketball does resemble LV much more on TV.” (Kruse Dec. Ex. bb at
LOU03478.)
12
Louis Vuitton again relies on the responses of certain focus groups, but as previously discussed, its Rule
56.1 Statement and related submissions have provided no basis to meaningfully weigh the focus group
evidence, and the Court declines to independently review the apparently lengthy videos of the groups that
are included in the record.
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- 46 responses by potential consumers of the products in question.” Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 746 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1984) (quotation marks omitted;
ellipsis in original). When a senior user asserts that its mark has been unlawfully used by
a defendant, the relevant survey universe is the prospective purchasers of the defendant’s
products. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 741 (2d Cir. 1994)
(discussing varying universes of survey participants as determined by plaintiff’s theory of
liability). In this case, the relevant universe would consist of prospective Hyundai Sonata
purchasers, and the relevant underlying issue is whether that population erroneously
believed that Louis Vuitton sponsored, affiliated or associated with Hyundai. See id.
According to Hyundai’s expert, a net eight percent of likely Hyundai
Sonata consumers either believed that Hyundai and Louis Vuitton were affiliated in the
“Luxury” ad, or that Louis Vuitton granted permission to use its marks. (Wind Dec. ¶ 9.)
Ten percent stated that they were more likely to purchase a Honda Sonata as a result of
the basketball in “Luxury.” (Wind Dec. ¶ 10.) Hyundai asserts that these figures reflect
an absence of actual confusion.
Louis Vuitton points out certain flaws in the Wind survey. They note that
the basketball showed to the control group was a chestnut-brown color. Indeed, by
depicting the ball in an atypical color that mimics the Louis Vuitton marks, a reasonable
trier of fact may question the control’s credibility. In addition, Wind asked participants,
“In creating the commercial, do you think the company that produces the advertised
brand or product [X] got or was required to get permission from any other company or
brand?” As Louis Vuitton notes, the question is not only compound, but requires
participants to draw a legal conclusion as to Hyundai’s obligations. In Louis Vuitton
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- 47 Malletier, S.A. v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 415, 444-45 & 445 n.161
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated in part on other grounds, 454 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2007), Judge
Scheindlin concluded that a consumer-confusion study premised on a similar question
“carr[ied] little weight,” and cited other district courts that reached the same conclusion. 13
To the extent that Louis Vuitton cites its own expert’s opinions in
opposition, that evidence is not directed to likely Hyundai Sonata purchasers and instead
looks to the misapprehension among all participants who recognized the Louis Vuitton
mark. (Pl. Opp. Mem. at 19.) While such views may be relevant in the dilution context –
where the inquiry is directed toward perceptions of the senior mark and the whittling
away of the senior mark’s power – they carry little or no weight under the relevant survey
universe as defined by Sterling Drug, 14 F.3d at 741, and do not shed light on the
ultimate issue of whether prospective Hyundai purchasers mistakenly believed that Louis
Vuitton sponsored, approved or affiliated with the “Luxury” ad.
For the reasons discussed, the Hyundai survey, while probative on
association, contains flaws that are better assessed by a jury on the issue of actual
confusion. Louis Vuitton’s arguably most probative evidence is a scattering of Twitter
postings by unknown users, and the research of its own expert is not probative of actual
confusion under Second Circuit authority. On this record, neither party has submitted
evidence that permits the Court to identify the presence or absence of actual confusion as
a matter of law.

13

There, the disputed survey asked respondents whether the defendant “needed to get permission or a
license from the company whose bags were shown in the ad.” 340 F. Supp. 2d at 444-45.
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The bad faith prong looks to “whether the defendant adopted its mark with
the intention of capitalizing on plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill and any confusion
between his and the senior user’s product.” The Sports Authority, Inc. v. Prime
Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 964 (2d Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted). As
previously noted, Ewanick stated that the basketball in the “Luxury” ad was intended “to
represent luxury definitely laddering and borrowing equity from Louis Vuitton.” (Pl.
56.1 ¶ 43; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 43.) Several other witnesses testified that the basketball
design was intended to closely resemble the Louis Vuitton marks.
As also noted, when Hyundai’s advertising firm sought permission from
thirteen luxury brands to use their marks in an advertisement, six expressly declined and
the others, including Louis Vuitton, never responded. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 10, 65, 66; Def. 56.1
Resp. ¶¶ 10, 65, 66.) This provides some evidence that Hyundai believed that it needed
permission to use the Louis Vuitton mark, but elected to proceed with the stylized
basketball anyway.
Lastly, when Louis Vuitton requested that Hyundai stop airing the ad,
Hyundai elected to go forward with its planned broadcast, even after commencement of
this litigation. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 20, 23, 27.)
In light of the foregoing, I conclude that Hyundai has not established as a
matter of law that the bad-faith prong weighs in its favor.
7. Product Quality.
As previously discussed, there is minimal competitive proximity between
Louis Vuitton and Hyundai. Louis Vuitton nevertheless contends that because of
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Hyundai, noting that Hyundai “aspires” to be a luxury brand, but is not comparable to
Louis Vuitton. (Pl. Opp. Mem. at 21.)
Assuming the accuracy of Louis Vuitton’s characterization of Hyundai, it
is nevertheless the case that the dissimilarity between plaintiff’s luxury consumer goods
and defendant’s automobiles are unlikely to cause confusion “because the products are
not otherwise related as to makeup, usage, etc.” Hormel, 73 F.3d at 505. I therefore
agree with Hyundai’s argument that this factor is irrelevant to determining consumer
confusion.
8. Consumer Sophistication
Given the expense of purchasing a new automobile and the market niche
for Louis Vuitton’s luxury products, the consumers of both Louis Vuitton products and
Hyundai Sonatas are likely to be highly sophisticated and attentive to their respective
purchases. See, e.g., Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 399 (2d Cir.
1995) (detailed purchasing process for pneumatic staplers supports consumer
sophistication); Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 368,
389 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“It cannot be reasonably disputed that consumers of products
offered by . . . Louis Vuitton . . . are sophisticated and discerning.”).
Based on this record, I cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that consumer
sophistication weighs in favor of either party. Because of the close similarity between
the Louis Vuitton marks and the basketball design, a sophisticated consumer could
plausibly conclude that the design in the “Luxury” ad originated with Louis Vuitton. A
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marks.
Hyundai has not come forward with evidence that establishes this prong in
its favor as a matter of law.
9. Hyundai’s First Amendment Arguments.
As noted, courts are not limited to the Polaroid factors when weighing the
likelihood of consumer confusion. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 454 F.3d at 118. I briefly
address Hyundai’s First Amendment arguments as specifically directed to plaintiff’s
trademark-infringement and unfair-competition claims.
Similar to its argument asserting a fair use defense under the TDRA,
Hyundai’s motion for summary judgment on Louis Vuitton’s trademark-infringement
claim is interspersed with contentions as to the “Luxury” ad’s expressive value and
humorous intentions. It contends that the ad’s expressive value weighs in Hyundai’s
favor on points of the marks’ strength, similarity of the marks and bad faith. As
previously noted, however, any comment in the “Luxury” ad is far more subtle than, for
example, the parody that inheres in a Muppet depicting an unkempt boar, Hormel Foods,
73 F.3d at 503, or a pet perfume that directly pokes fun at a high-end fashion label,
Tommy Hilfiger, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 415, 422. Moreover, Hyundai has acknowledged
that it intended to make no comment on the Louis Vuitton mark, but instead offered a
broader social critique. The Second Circuit has deemed such motivations unworthy of
protection. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310.
Therefore, based on the record and the law of this Circuit, I conclude that
any intended expression in the “Luxury” ad does not weigh in Hyundai’s favor.
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As noted, I conclude that the minimal competitive proximity and
likelihood of bridging the gap weigh in favor of Hyundai. Hyundai also has established
that any difference in product quality is not material to assessing consumer confusion.
On the point of actual confusion, the evidence provided by both parties, while somewhat
probative, is insufficient to determine as a matter of law whether this prong favors
Hyundai. On all other Polaroid factors, Hyundai has failed to set forth evidence that
entitle it to judgment in its favor as a matter of law.
The Polaroid factors guide a court in reaching the ultimate question of
whether there is a likelihood of consumer confusion. See, e.g., Morningside Grp., 182
F.3d at 142 (good faith is not alone dispositive to the ultimate issue of consumer
confusion); Lee Myles Auto Grp., LLC v. Fiorello, 2010 WL 3466687, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 25, 2010) (“The Polaroid factors must be considered in the context of how each
factor supports or undermines the ultimate issue of whether a consumer will be confused
by the disputed marks.”). They are not to be applied using “some rigid formula,” and
“[e]ach case” may “present[ ] its own peculiar circumstances.” Lois Sportswear, 799
F.2d at 872. Hyundai has not made any effort to explain how a balancing of the factors
should be applied in this case, and asserts only that because all factors should weigh in its
favor, there is no likelihood of confusion, especially “against the backdrop of First
Amendment principles.” (Def. Mem. at 14.) It does not argue that the Court should
place special emphasis on the lack of competitive proximity between Louis Vuitton or
Hyundai, or emphasize the lack of evidence that Louis Vuitton intends to “bridge the
gap” at some point in the future.
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- 52 In balancing the Polaroid factors, I conclude that Hyundai has not
established that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Louis Vuitton’s trademark
infringement claims. Hyundai’s motion for summary judgment is therefore denied.
B. Hyundai’s Motion as to Damages is Denied.
As noted, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5)(B)(i) allows for damages only if a
defendant “willfully intended to trade on the recognition of the famous mark.”
Hyundai argues that, even in the event that Louis Vuitton can establish
willfulness, the record would not permit a reasonable juror to conclude “that even one”
Sonata sale resulted from the stylized basketball in the “Luxury” ad. (Def. Mem. at 2325.) Hyundai argues that the “Luxury” ad was “just a first step in a buying process,” and
that the evidence is too attenuated to attribute any sales to the ad. (Def. Mem. at 23-24.)
In opposition, Louis Vuitton argues that “the simplest measure” of damages is for a jury
to award it “the roughly $3.2 million” that Hyundai spent to produce and air the ad. (Pl.
Opp. Mem. at 23.) Louis Vuitton also cites to the report of its damages expert, Laura
Stamm, who has opined that the Louis Vuitton-like designs were “integral” to the
“Luxury” ad, that the ad caused a spike in visits to Hyundai’s website, and that
“approximately $14.5 million” in profits “can be attributed to the dilutive and infringing
advertisement . . . .” (Shapiro Dec. Ex. 40 at 3, 4.) Hyundai asserts that Stamm’s
conclusions are unreliable because they are extrapolations based on studies of year-long
advertising campaigns that do not compare to the “Luxury” ad’s limited run. (Def. Mem.
at 23 n.26.) Based on the record and the parties’ contentions, a finder of fact is best
positioned to determine how much credit should be afforded to Stamm’s research, or
whether, as Hyundai contends, her views are “simply not plausible.” (Def. Mem. at 24.)
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CONCLUSION
Louis Vuitton's motion for summary judgment in its favor on liability on
Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint is GRANTED.
Hyundai's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
P. Kevin Castel
United States District Judge
Dated: New York, New York
March 22, 2012

